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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an attempt by the plaintiff herein to halt the 
proposed sale of city-owned property at First South and State 
Streets in Salt Lake City by the defendant Salt Lake City 
acting through its Board of Commissioners in accordance 
with a proposal made by the Salt Lake City Chamber of 
Commerce on behalf of Zions Securities Corporation. 
It is common knowledge that a new federal building for 
Salt Lake City is being proposed for the site and that the 
ultimate purchaser will be the Unted States of America. When 
it became generally known that this corner was being con-
sidered as a site for a federal building, the Board of Commis-
sioners scheduled a public hearing on December 29, 1959, at 
which the question of the adequacy of the structures on this 
property was fully and carefully discussed, and it was the 
general consensus that such buildings were inadequate and 
obsolete. Thereupon, on January 21, I960, the Board of 
Commissioners passed a resolution which declared the structures 
to be inadequate and obsolete for the present and future needs 
of Salt Lake City. The resolution also declared that the facili-
ties should be replaced on a new situs more centrally located 
in relation to the other offices of city government. 
The Board of Commissioners thereupon determined that 
the property should be sold and advertised for bids. Only the 
bid of the Chamber of Commerce was received, and such bid 
was duly acted upon by the Board of Commissioners and 
the contemplated sale of the property is to the Chamber of 
Commerce or Zions Securities Corporation for transfer to the 
4 
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United States, and it is contemplated that a federal building 
will be erected thereon. 
The trial court upheld the proposed sale of this property 
and the method whereby it was sold'by granting defendants' 
motions to dismiss, stating respecting these defendants as 
follows: 
" . . . Although the sale of the same might have been 
handled in a different manner, still Salt Lake City 
through its Board of Commissioners and Legal Depart-
ment handled the matter in the manner in which they 
thought proper, and if some other procedure than was 
used by them should be used, then the Legislature 
should so provide . . ." 
These defendants will not attempt to answer individually 
all the points raised in appellant's brief, for it is our contention 
that all the points raised in appellant's brief are so much 
window-dressing to the real issues in this case concerning these 
defendants and that these real issues are: 
(1) Does the City Board of Commissioners, acting in an 
official meeting, have the power to sell city-owned property, 
undedicated except by use, for a fair consideration, and, in 
particular, can it sell such property when it determines the 
property to be inadequate and obsolete? 
(2) If this transaction involves the LDS church as plaintiff 
alleges, do the members of the Board of Commissioners who 
are also LDS church members have an unlawful conflict of 
interest in such sale? 
(3) Does plaintiff have standing to question the sale of 
the said property without alleging a pecuniary detriment to 
5 
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himself and in any event, does he have standing to question 
the method of sale? 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE SALT LAKE CITY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
HAS POWER TO SELL CITY PROPERTY. 
POINT II 
MEMBERSHIP IN A CHURCH WITH WHOM THE 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS TRANSACTS BUSINESS 
DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO AN UNLAWFUL CONFLICT 
OF INTEREST. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF HAS NO STANDING TO QUESTION 
THE SALE OF THIS PROPERTY NOR THE METHOD 
WHEREBY THE SALE WAS MADE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE SALT LAKE CITY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
HAS POWER TO SELL CITY PROPERTY. 
(A) City Property in General. 
6 
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While it is true that municipal corporations are creatures 
of the state and restricted to their express or implied powers, 
it is equally true that the cities of this state have been given 
broad and sweeping powers over city-owned property. 
Section 10-8-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"The boards of commissioners . . . of cities shall have 
the power to control the finances and property of the 
corporation." (Emphasis added.) 
Section 10-8-2, U.C.A. 1853, provides: 
"They . . . may purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, 
convey and dispose of property, real and personal, for 
the benefit of the city both within and without its cor-
porate boundaries, improve and protect such property, 
and may do all other things in relation thereto as natural 
persons." (Emphasis added.) 
Section 10-8-8, U.C.A. 1953, also provides: 
"They may lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, 
narrow, extend, grade, pave or otherwise improve 
streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks, parks, 
airports and public grounds, and may vacate the same 
or parts thereof, by ordinance." (Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiff argues in his brief that Section 10-8-8 requires 
that a vacating ordinance be passed before city-held property 
may be sold. It is the City's contention that the section clearly 
states that when property is established by ordinance, it must 
be vacated by ordinance. It is clear and natural that the act 
abandoning must have equal dignity with the act establishing 
and therefore, establishment by ordinance means vacation by 
ordinance. The position of the final comma in the statute 
makes this clear: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Cities may "establish . . . public grounds, and may 
vacate the same or parts thereof, by ordinance.'' 
In other words, the same public grounds that have been 
established by ordinance may be vacated by ordinance. The 
City has power to undo what it has once done. Therefore, 
since the property at First South and State Streets was never 
dedicated to the use of the municipality by ordinance, resolution 
or otherwise, except such dedication as may have arisen from 
actual use, the action of the Board of Commissioners in deter-
mining to sell such property is of equal dignity with the action 
whereby the said board of commissioners devoted the property 
to the use of the public, and Section 10-8-8 does not stand 
in the way of this sale. Plaintiff seems to contend that an ordi-
nance is required for every act of the City; if this were the 
case, the City would be bankrupted by its publishing bill. 
Ordinances are required only for the exercise of the legislative 
power and to vacate property previously dedicated by ordinance. 
Neither does there appear to be any good reason for the 
claimed restriction of Section 10-8-2 to property held by the 
municipality in a non-governmental capacity. Since the City 
is given absolute power to vacate the public use in property 
that has been dedicated even by ordinance, it certainly can sell 
the same upon the extinguishment of the public use regardless 
of the means by which that extinguishment is accomplished. 
Two dicta statements in early Utah cases might seem to 
indicate a contrary opinion, but in neither of them was the 
question decided and in both the matter was not carefully 
considered under the present statutes and Constitution of Utah. 
In the more recent of the two, McDonald v. Price, 45 Utah 
8 
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464, 146 Pac. 550, the court held that a specific statute gov-
erning the sale of light and power plants prevailed over the 
general statutes governing sales of city property. The court 
said that the Legislature had the power to prescribe the method 
by which the power of the city to sell might be exercised, 
and that it could provide this method in respect to all or only 
a particular kind of property. As a side comment, the court 
said: 
" . . . As to property such as streets, alleys, parks, 
public buildings and the like, although the title is in 
the city, yet such property, it may be said, is held in 
trust for strictly corporate purposes, and, as a general 
rule, cannot be sold or disposed of so long as it is 
being used for the purposes for which it was acquired." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The court makes no application or reference to the Utah 
statutes cited herein because the general rule quoted by the 
court is held to be inapplicable. We are willing to admit that 
the court correctly states the general rule respecting municipal 
property and that municipal property is subject to the control 
of the legislature. Rhyne, Municipal Law, Sec. 16-11, Page 
379. However, in Utah, the Legislature has spoken and has 
given the City authority to sell and dispose of all types of 
public property. The cases are unanimous that where cities 
are given power by the Legislature to vacate public grounds 
in addition to the general authority to sell and convey real 
property, the city has complete and plenary power over its 
property. The cases from other jurisdictions where this power 
has not been granted to cities are not applicable where the 
power has been granted. Thus, in McCarter v. City of Raton, 
45 N.M. 351, 115 P.2d 90, the question was whether the city 
9 
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could vacate a park and dispose of it. The court held that it 
could and stated: 
"The contention of appellant is that the City of 
Raton holds said property as a trustee for the benefit 
and use of the public, and is without authority to 
vacate it, or any portion of it, for any purpose; . . . 
"By general law, cities in New Mexico were at the 
time of the acquisition of said property, and still are, 
authorized 'to lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, 
extend, grade, pave, or otherwise improve streets, 
alleys, avenues, sidewalks, parks, and public grounds, 
and vacate the same . . . 
"We need not go into the question of what the 
authority of the city would have been in the absence 
of such a statute. Appellant cites numerous decisions as 
supporting his contention. None is authority on the 
question here to be decided because none involves 
application to similar facts of a statute authorizing 
municipalities to vacate parks. . . " (Emphasis added.) 
That this is the unanimous rule where a similar statute 
exists appears in the case of Lloyd v. City of Great Falls, 107 
Mont. 442, 86 P.2d 395, by the cases cited therein which are 
to the same effect. See also Carson v. State, 240 Iowa 1178, 38 
N.W.2d 168. 
The statement in the other Utah case that might concern 
the court is the statement of Judge Zane in Ogden City v. 
Bear Lake and River Water-Works and Irrigation Co., 16 
Utah 440, 52 Pac. 697, wherein, speaking for himself only 
and not for the court, he stated: 
"But property devoted to a public use cannot be sold 
or leased without special statutory authority.'' (Empha-
sis added.) 
10 
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The confusion in this case probably stems from the fact 
that the case was initiated before statehood, since it is clear 
that this statement was not well considered in the reflected 
light of the Utah Constitution and statutes adopted after 
statehood. The Utah Constitution, by Article VI, Section 26, 
prohibits "special statutory authority" in this field. It states: 
"The Legislature is prohibited from enacting any 
private or special laws in the following cases: . . . 
vacating . . . public grounds . . . " 
To require special statutory authority as Judge Zane 
would appear to require is to demand an impossibility and the 
foregoing statement of Judge Zane should be completely over-
ruled. The court should not blindly follow such a completely 
unworkable dicta statement from one judge and if it does, 
the stinging rebuke of the stanza of the poet William Cowper's 
"Tirocinium" would be applicable: 
"The slaves of custom and established mode, 
With packhorse constancy we keep the road, 
Crooked or straight, through quags and thorny dells, 
True to the jingling of our leader's bells. 
So follow foolish precedents, and wink 
With both our eyes, is easier than to think." 
quoted from the State of Montana ex rel Tripp v. District 
Court, 130 Mont. 574, 305 P.2d 1101, (dissenting opinion). 
It is clear that the Legislature of Utah has given the 
broadest power possible to cities to sell and convey property. 
The present power granted by the Legislature provides that 
cities can vacate public grounds and may "Sell, lease, convey 
and dispose of property, real and personal, for the benefit of 
11 
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the city . . . and may do all other things in relation thereto as 
natural persons." 
Certainly the Legislature, by its language, intended the 
City to have the complete control over its property and that 
result is as it should be. Why should the Legislature, which 
is responsible not only to citizens of Salt Lake City but also 
to citizens of other parts of the state, exercise greater control 
over Salt Lake City property than the Salt Lake City Board 
of Commissioners, which is responsible only to the citizens 
of Salt Lake City in the exercise of its control of city property ? 
Nowhere in the statutes of the State is there any restriction 
on the method whereby property of the nature under discussion 
must be sold. Consequently, it is for the Board of Commis-
sioners to decide how it will exercise its powers concerning 
the sale of property and for plaintiff to contend that the 
sale of the property must be consummated in a certain manner 
is to substitute the judgment of an individual taxpayer for 
the judgment of a duly elected and constituted Board of 
Commissioners of Salt Lake City. 
In addition, the sale of the properties involved in this 
action for a fair consideration by the City is not the disposition 
of trust property, but is merely an exchange by the City of 
trust estates and is an exchange that the elected officials of the 
City feel is in the best interest of the citizens of Salt Lake 
City. If the citizens disapprove of the sale of this property, 
they can reflect their displeasure at the polls, but the court 
should not interfere with municipal government in the face 
of such clear and unambiguous authorizing legislation as is 
set forth herein. 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Miller v. City of Pasco, 50 Wash. 2d 229, 310 P.2d 
863, the court held that a statute providing that cities might 
"control and dispose of it (property) for the common benefit," 
gave the city the power to sell a park. The court held that the 
words "dispose of" were to be given their usual and ordinary 
meaning. The court also held that since the city had been 
given no general authority to lease property, a specific statute 
authorizing the sale or lease of this particular piece of property 
was unconstitutional special legislation. 
In 141 A.L.R., Page 1459, the author states: 
"In other cases holding that a municipality may 
properly sell its real property under a general grant of 
power to acquire, hold or convey property, no distinc-
tion has been made as to whether the property was 
held in a governmental capacity or was devoted to 
public use and typical of cases of this nature are 
Matthews v. Darby (1928), 165 Ga. 509, 41 S.E. 304 
(city hall); Shaves v. Salisbury (1873), 63 N.E. 29 
(town hall and public square); Thompson v. Nemeyer 
(1899), 50 Ohio St. 486, 52 N.E. 1024 (gas plant); 
Verlin Bros Co. v. Toledo (1900), 20 Ohio CC 603, 
11 Ohio CD. 56 (gas plant)." 
To this list may be added Carter v. City of Greenville, 175 
S. Car. 130, 178 S.E. 508, (1935), (city hall). 
(B) Obsolete and Inadequate Property in Particular. 
What has been said in respect to all city property applies 
to an even greater degree to property that has become inade-
quate and obsolete. 
Even without the specific authority given by Section 
10-8-8, U.C.A. 1953, supra, it is the general rule of law that 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the public trust in governmentally-held property ceases when 
the property becomes inadequate and obsolete. This is stated 
succinctly in Rhyne's Municipal Laiv, Section 16-11, Page 379: 
"The state legislature has complete control over the 
sale and distribution of municipal property, subject 
only to constitutional provisions relating to local and 
special legislation. It is the general rule that in the 
absence of charter or statutory authority, municipal 
property dedicated and being used for a governmental 
purpose, or held in trust may not be sold by a munici-
pality . . . However, it is an equally well-settled propo-
sition that property which has outlived its usefulness, 
or which has become inadequate for the public purpose 
to which it had formally been dedicated . . . may be 
sold by a municipality without specific legislative 
authority, under a general grant of statutory or charter 
authority to hold and to convey property.'' (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the case of Marshall v. Mayor, etc., of City of Meridian, 
103 Miss. 206, 60 So. 135, the court held that an old city hall 
could be sold even though its use had not in fact yet ceased 
when provision had been made for building a new city hall. 
The court said: 
"In the absence of legislative authority, a municipal 
corporation is without power to sell or dispose of 
property held by it for governmental purposes. By the 
city's charter, appellees are empowered to 'purchase 
and hold real, personal and mixed property, and may 
dispose of the same for the benefit of said city.' This 
provision of the charter clearly gives appellees power 
to sell property under some circumstances. It may be 
that this general grant of power carries with it no 
authority to sell property held and used for govern-
mental purposes, as to which we express no opinion; 
14 
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but when such property has ceased to be used for such 
purposes, the reasons for the rule prohibiting the 
sale thereof cease, so that the rule itself ceases, and 
thereafter it can be sold under this general power to 
sell. There can be no question that, under a general 
grant of power to sell, a city has the power to sell 
property which it owns not charged with a trust. In 
the case at bar the only trust charged upon the property, 
other than the general trust under which all municipal 
property is held, is that which results from its being 
dedicated to a public use, and when this use shall law-
fully cease this trust will cease also. It is true that the 
use of this property for public purposes has not in 
fact ceased, but provision has been made for the build-
ing of a new city hall and the sale of the old city hall 
is but a preliminary thereto, and in aid thereof, and 
when the new city hall is built, the use of the old will 
cease. 
"Where a city is empowered to build a new city hall, 
and the money which can be realized from a sale of its 
old hall will be of material aid in so doing, it ought 
to have power to sell its old hall for that purpose, and 
we are aware of no good reason for holding that it 
has not!' (Emphasis added.) 
Judge Zane, in Ogden City v. Bear Lake and River Water-
Works & Irrigation Co., supra, although mistaken in his state-
ment concerning special legislation, recognizes the right and 
necessity for the city to be able to dispose of obsolete and 
inadequate property when he states: 
"Public buildings may become unfit for public use, 
and for sufficient reasons the city may not wish to build 
upon the same lot; and such buildings, and the lots 
upon which they stand, may be no longer used by 
the public. The city from time to time may have other 
classes of property that has ceased to be used, or is 
15 
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not used by the public. All such property of a municipal 
corporation, not devoted to the public use, may be sold 
or leased under the general authority to sell or lease, 
as the public welfare may demand. Such property may 
be converted into money or other things, and in that 
form devoted to the use of the public." 
The determination of the city to sell is not subject to 
judicial review in the absence of fraud or bad faith, neither 
of which has been alleged. In Board of Revenue of Etowah 
County v. Hutchins, 250 Ala. 173 33 So.2d 737, the city needed a 
new jail and courthouse and decided not to build on the old 
site. The court said: 
"It [the Board of Revenue] therefore had authority 
to direct and control the property of the county as it 
may deem expedient according to law, . . . to erect and 
to keep in order and repair the buildings of the county 
at county expense . . . and to erect courthouses, jails, 
and hospitals and other necessary county buildings, 
"When acting within the limits fixed by law and the 
constitution, the authority of the board over the par-
ticular matter in question ivas all-encompassing. It 
was within its exclusive discretion to determine the 
necessity for a new courthouse and jail and the proper 
place within the county seat for its location. In making 
this determination the board acted in a quasi-legislative 
capacity and in the absence of fraud, corruption, or 
unfair dealings that action is not subject to judicial 
control or revision. 
" . . . the board of revenue was within its authority 
to enter into a binding contract for the sale of the 
present courthouse site, no bad faith attending the 
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transaction. The contract to sell the old property was 
a part of the plan of obtaining a new courthouse and 
jail . . . This likewise was a matter consecrated to 
the discretion of the managing board of the county and 
unless it were shown that the discretion has been 
arbitrarily exercised and bad faith entered into the 
action it cannot be challenged. 
* 'While a municipality has no implied power to alien 
or dispose of property dedicated to or held in trust for 
the public use, . . . ordinarily its property abandoned 
from public use or not devoted thereto may be disposed 
of by the managing authorities when acting in good 
faith and without fraud. 
r(
 . . . It would be a legal casuistry to extract from 
the statute an interpretation that would require the 
postponement to a probably unpropitious time the exe-
cution of a contract for the disposal of the old property 
when complete plans had been put under way for the 
procurement of a new facility and the abandonment 
of the old one." (Emphasis added.) 
In Schutz v. City Council of City of New England, N. Dak., 
61 N.W.2d 423, the court said: 
"It is well settled that The discretionary powers of 
municipal authorities will not be interfered with in a 
suit by a taxpayer for an injunction in the absence of 
fraud or palpable abuse/ 
To the same effect of both these points are the following 
authorities: Pioneer Inv. & Trust Co. v. Board of Education, 
35 Utah 1, 99 Pac. 150; Griffis v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Via., 
104 So. 2d 33; Kirkland v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 824, 76 S.E. 2d 
396; Blaser v. Dalles City, 171 Ore. 441, 137 P.2d 991; Miller 
v. City of Pasco, 50 Wash. 2d 229, 310 P.2d 863; Fussell-
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Graham-Alderson Co. v. Forrest City, 145 Ark. 375, 224 S.W. 
745; Reed v. Village of Hibbing, 150 Minn. 130, 184 N.W. 
842; Babin v. City of Ashland, 160 Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E. 2d 
580; Carson v. State, 240 Iowa 1178, 38 N.W. 2d 168; City of 
New Orleans v. Louisiana Society, 229 La. 246, 85 So. 2d 503; 
Dix v. Port of Port Orford, 131 Ore. 157, 282 Pac. 109; South-
eastern Greyhound Lines v. City of Lexington, 299 Ky. 510, 
186 S.W. 2d 201; Ravenelle v. City of Woonsocket, 73 R.I. 
270, 54 A.2d 376; Hermann v. City of Lake Mills, 275 Wis. 
537, 82 N.W.2d 167; Seafeldt v. Port of Astoria, 141 Ore. 
418, 16 P.2d 943; Haesloop v. City Council of Charleston, 123 
S. Car. 272, 115 S.E. 596; Hall v. City & County of Denver, 
115 Colo. 538, 177 P.2d 234. 
Certainly the determination of the Board of Commissioners 
that these properties are inadequate and obsolete is not infused 
with the fraud, bad faith or palpable abuse of discretion 
necessary to invoke the conscience of equity, and to require 
this court to void the sale of this property. 
POINT II 
MEMBERSHIP IN A CHURCH WITH WHOM THE 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS TRANSACTS BUSINESS 
DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO AN UNLAWFUL CONFLICT 
OF INTEREST. 
McQuillin, in Municipal Corporations, Section 29.97, Page 
390, states: 
'The interest of an officer which will render void a 
contract with a city, is a present, personal, and pecuniary 
interest." 
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In the case of Furlong v. South Park Commissioners, 350 
111. 363, 172 N.E. 757, the claimed disqualifying interest was 
that five members of the park commission were to be trustees of 
a museum corporation, a non-profit corporation with whom 
the park commissioners were contracting. The court held that 
the agreement was not in violation of the corrupt practices 
act and said: 
" I n general, the disqualifying interest must be of a 
pecuniary or proprietary nature.' And it is said in 44 
Corpus Juris, 93: 'An interest to invalidate the con-
tract must be of a personal or private nature, so that 
an interest incident to a membership in a corporation 
organized for the public welfare, and not for profit, 
will not have that effect/ 
See also Quackenbush v. City of Cheyenne, 52 Wyo. 146, 
70 P.2d 577; Mumma v. Town of Brewster, 11A Wash. 112, 
24 P.2d 458;Panozzo v. City of Kockford, 306 111. App. 443, 
28 N.E. 2d 748; Crawford v. Clifton Heights, (1901), 11 Pa. 
Dist. R. 630, 140 A.L.R, 349. 
Certainly members of the Board of Commissioners do 
not have to live in a complete vacuum. They can be members 
of churches and have dealings with those churches. Otherwise, 
only atheists who were complete social outcasts and owed 
allegiance to no one could hold public office. The complete 
absurdity of plaintiff's position in respect to conflicts of interest 
is illustrated by the fact that no case in point has ever arisen 
even though statutes and the common law have prohibited 
conflicts in interest for centuries. All of plaintiff's cited cases 
involve some sort of pecuniary interest; some involve an imme-
diate interest, some a remote interest, but all involve a pecuniary 
interest nevertheless. 
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POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF HAS NO STANDING TO QUESTION 
THE SALE OF THIS PROPERTY NOR THE METHOD 
WHEREBY THE SALE WAS MADE. 
This property was sold after appraisal for a fair considera-
tion. Plaintiff has failed to allege wherein he, as a taxpayer, 
will suffer as a result of this sale. That he must allege and 
prove pecuniary loss in order to have standing in court is 
universally recognized. 
In the case of Henderson v. McCormick, 70 Ariz. 19, 215 
P.2d 608, the city made a sale of a truck to a person with whom 
a city officer had an admittedly unlawful interest in the contract. 
However, it appeared the buyer paid as much or more than 
the truck was worth. The court said a taxpayer's action could 
not be maintained, and stated: 
"The authorities universally uphold the rule that a 
taxpayer may maintain an action only when such tax-
payer, and taxpayers as a class, have sustained or will 
sustain pecuniary loss. 
"There is unanimity in the authorities that where the 
plaintiffs as taxpayers, or the taxpayers as a class, 
sustain no injury, a court of equity is powerless to 
grant relief . . . 
"The suit was improvidently brought by plaintiffs 
and to uphold the judgment of the lower court would 
encourage disgruntled citizens to resort to the courts 
in the guise of taxpayers' suits, thereby, in effect, taking 
over and throttling the administration of municipal 
affairs." (Emphasis added.) 
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To the same effect is Quackenbush v. City of Cheyenne, 
supra, and see also Lyon v. Bateman, 119 Utah 434, 228 P.2d 
818, wherein this court said: 
" . . . the various courts have always required an 
allegation and a showing that the taxpayer is subject 
to some pecuniary loss . . . The attack alleged is not 
that the expenditures, if made, will be for unlawful 
or illegal purposes, but rather for legitimate state 
services. In all of the cases cited, it will be noted 
that there was illegality in the purpose of the appro-
priation, not irregularities in the manner of making 
the money available." 
This plaintiff has failed to allege or offered to prove any 
pecuniary loss and this alone defeats his right to this action. 
To an even greater extent, plaintiff has no standing to 
question the method employed by the Board of Commissioners 
to effect this sale. The authorities cited herein under Point I 
(B) and especially the cases of the Board of Revenue of 
Etowah County v. Hutchins, supra, and Schutz v. City Council 
of City of New England, supra, are clear that the court will 
not interfere with the actions of governmental bodies in the 
absence of fraud or palpable abuse, neither of which has been 
alleged. Plaintiff cannot, in the guise of a taxpayer suit, decide 
the method of operation of municipal affairs. Even if he can 
attack the right of the Board of Commissioners to sell city 
property, he cannot attack the procedure adopted by the Board 
of Commissioners in selling the same. 
There is absolutely no justification for plaintiff's con-
tentions that the sale should have proceeded in a certain manner. 
Mandatory requirements must be made by the Legislature 
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and none have been made in Utah. The Legislature has seen 
fit to give the Board of Commissioners the complete power 
over city property and the only requirements set forth in the 
statutes are that formal action of the commission must be done 
openly and that a majority of a quorum of commissioners must 
concur. 
CONCLUSION 
From all that has been stated, it is clear that the City had 
full authority to sell the property in question, that plaintiff 
has no standing to question its sale, and that no unlawful 
conflict of interest bars the Board of Commissioners from 
doing business with Zions Securities Corporation or for that 
matter with the LDS Church. The trial court's dismissal of 
the first cause of action should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES L. BARKER, JR. 
City Attorney 
NORMAN W. KETTNER 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents Salt Lake City Cor-
poration, /. Bracken Lee, foe L. 
Christensen, L. C. Romney, T. 
L Geurts and /. K. Piercey, its 
Commissioners, 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UW LIBRARY 
HTAH DOCUMENT COU£CI(OM 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
